Expert Testimony on Child Interviewing Not Barred in Washington
Expert testimony on the susceptibility of children to suggestion and the effects on their memories of particular interview techniques may be admitted in Washington state courts. The Washington Supreme Court resolved lingering doubt about this in State v. Willis, 151 Wn.2d 255, 87 P.3d 1164 (2004), a child rape case.
The prosecution had argued that the susceptibility of children to misleading interview techniques was within the common knowledge of jurors and therefore was never a fit subject for expert testimony. It relied on State v. Swan, 114 Wn.2d 613, 656, 790 P.2d 610 (1990), where the supreme court approved a trial court decision excluding such testimony.
The prosecution had construed the Swan decision too broadly, the Willis court said. It explained:
We hew to our conclusion in Swan that the general principle that younger children are more susceptible to suggestion is "well within the understanding of the jury." Swan, 114 Wn.2d at 656. But we also agree with the Court of Appeals that specialized knowledge regarding the effects of specific interview techniques and protocols "is not likely within the common experience of the jury." Willis, 113 Wn.App. at 394. For example, that wet pavement is more slippery than dry pavement is within the general knowledge of the jury. That does not prevent the admissibility of expert testimony regarding specific stopping distances under specific friction coefficients created when specific driving surfaces are wet. Similarly, merely because it is a matter of general knowledge that children's memories are changeable does not preclude testimony that specific interview techniques might compromise specific memories.
The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by ER 702 and requires a case by case inquiry.
The supreme court then inquired into the need for the testimony of psychologist John Yuille in the Willis case. It concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding his testimony, which found fault with the investigative interview of the complaining child. Because the child's "most critical" testimony in court matched her statements before the investigative interview, the court reasoned that Dr. Yuille could not have helped the jury evaluate that testimony. The court also said Dr. Yuille's testimony about the interview was "highly equivocal." Conviction affirmed.
Copyright © 2004 David S. Marshall
