Connecticut courts admit scientific expert testimony only if it meets the federal court standard set in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Connecticut courts do not apply the Daubert standard to non-scientific expert testimony (even though federal courts now do, Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999)).

In State v. Vumback, 68 Conn.App. 313, 791 A.2d 569 (2002), the trial court admitted a pediatric professor’s testimony to explain that child sex abuse victims are often imprecise in their allegations. The professor also gave common reasons children delay reporting sex abuse. He had not examined the complainant. His testimony was based, the court said, on his education and his experience with the allegations of many child sex abuse victims.

The defendant was convicted and appealed. He argued that the professor’s testimony did not meet the Daubert standard and so was not admissible.

The Connecticut Appellate Court cited state precedent that testimony is not scientific if the trier of fact can weigh its probative value without “abandoning common sense and sacrificing independent judgment to the expert’s assertions,” even if the expert’s skill and training are based on science. It ruled that the professor’s testimony “was not based on obscure scientific theories that were potentially misleading to the trier of fact.” Accordingly, it held, the testimony did not need to meet the Daubert standard to be admitted.

Oregon courts decide whether to admit scientific expert testimony by a standard similar to the Daubert standard. In State v. Sanchez-Cruz, 177 Or.App. 332, 33 P.3d 1037 (2001), a pediatrician at Portland’s CARES center for child abuse examinations testified. She said she had examined the child complainant, had received a medical history taken by a child interviewer, and had diagnosed child sex abuse.

The defendant was convicted and appealed. He argued that the diagnosis of child sex abuse was scientific and did not meet Oregon’s heightened admissibility standard for scientific evidence.

The Oregon Court of Appeals said that whether evidence is “scientific” depends mostly on whether a jury will see it as scientific. Earlier Oregon cases had reasoned that juries perceive scientific evidence to have “enhanced persuasive force;” they equate science with truth. Courts therefore should test scientific evidence more rigorously before admitting it.

The Sanchez-Cruz court agreed with the defendant that a medical diagnosis would be perceived as scientific by a jury and so should meet the standard for scientific testimony. It then ruled that the pediatrician’s diagnosis did meet that standard and affirmed the conviction.

State courts in Washington do not use the Daubert standard or any variant of it. For novel scientific testimony, they use the older Frye standard. For scientific testimony that is not novel, they have no heightened standard of admissibility. For example, in State v. Young, 62 Wn.App. 895, 802 P.2d 829 (1991), a pediatrician examined a child’s genitals with a colposcope and testified that their condition was consistent with sex abuse. The Washington Court of Appeals found that “this testimony did not involve any new methods of proof or new scientific principles,” so it was admissible without application of the Frye standard.